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ARTICLES

C. J. ARTHUR, On the Historical Understanding V, 203-216

Gallie contends that historical narrative differs from the generalizing natural sciences and can be understood with peculiar directness. In following a story through contingent events to its conclusion, explicit explanation is needed only rarely. But although history is in some sense a narrative, Gallie fails to see that a story can be followed only if one has a fund of generalizations. Judgment about acceptable contingencies rests on prior appreciation of a framework of generalized expectations that are not falsified by particular incidents. Contingencies are unique only because they are counter to this framework — which serves to limit outcomes and the possible role of contingent happenings, not for deducing events. History is not entirely like art; we are interested in the connections of events, not only in the outcome of a story.

ROBERT D. BAIRD, Interpretative Categories and the History of Religions V, Bei. 8, 17-30

The history of religions is divided into phenomenological and historical branches: the former has no definite interpretative categories but the latter does, namely the “religions” — Hinduism, Buddhism, Christianity, and others. But the “religions” are misleading and preclude understanding, for these categories were imposed before historical research and are neither historical nor religious. A definition of religion is needed to begin, and Tillich’s suggestion — religion is ultimate concern — is functional, enables us to identify what we are looking for, and is non-judgmental. The “religions,” on the other hand, imply an essence of each religion and preclude the examination of the religious experience of each individual in his own terms. The historical study of religion should be undertaken according to areas, not “religions,” and the final step should be determination of the “types” of concern — the task of phenomenology.

RUDOLPH BINION, Repeat Performance: A Psychohistorical Study of Leopold III and Belgian Neutrality VIII, 213-259

Leopold III revived Belgium’s neutrality, which facilitated Hitler’s conquests. Leopold upheld this policy even though he foresaw with anguish that it meant Belgium’s destruction. A psychoanalytical explanation is required. Unconsciously, Leopold was imitating his father in many ways;
but more importantly, he was reliving an automobile accident in which he had unintentionally driven his wife, Queen Astrid, to her death. Belgium took the dead Queen’s place for him unconsciously as he led Belgium to the disaster of May 1940. Reliving a trauma is the normal way of abreacting it. In this case, a private accident had enormous public consequences. The historian’s task is the exacting analysis of specific causation such as this.

DAVID BRAYBROOKE, Refinements of Culture in Large-Scale History

Models of culture and representations of changes in culture as changes between such models can be validated without making unreasonable departures from the validating conditions for basic narratives. Von Wright’s logic of norms provides a useful analysis of the concept of rule and hence a basis for constructing models of cultures as systems of rules. As illustrations from historical work on the eighteenth-century origins of the British permanent civil service and on administrative developments in Tudor England show, the logic of norms brings to light the logical issues that are of critical importance to changes in culture. These issues, like the models on which they depend, involve human expectations through involving human conventions; but one must also acknowledge parallel systems of description which can figure in covering-law explanations.

I. A. F. BRUCE, Theopompus and Classical Greek Historiography

Though no substantial part of any of the work of Theopompus has survived, more than four hundred references to him or quotations from him by other ancient authors indicate his importance and offer the possibility of assessing his work. Because Theopompus incorporated most of the earlier varieties of historical research, his work may be called the crowning achievement of classical Greek historiography. His grouping of events by subject, references to geography and ethnography, and encyclopedic range of interest suggest the influence of Herodotus, while his decision to write a contemporary political history owes most to the example of Thucydides. However, by enlarging the traditional view of the world, by adding utopianism and philosophy to mythography, and by introducing moral judgments and instruction to biography, he also became the forerunner of Hellenistic historiography.

KINS COLLINS, Marx on the English Agricultural Revolution: Theory and Evidence

Marx claimed that the Agricultural Revolution in eighteenth-century England — as he presented it — is explained by his general theory of history. By this he meant that sentences describing the Revolution are logical consequences of his theory. But according to Popper’s theory of
PAUL W.
Historical only we can
action actors make narrative Estetica edge this and was not
Neither statement derived
Though...tory. For
repetition...of...accounts...Marx's...Marx's...Marx's...The...the...false,
these...of...as...false,..these...so...similar...published
Estetica...Becker's...itself;...in...Repetition...of...the...in...all...Greek...historians...saw...repetition...of...identical...patterns...in...history. The Jews saw history as realization of God's revealed plan for the future. The Jewish-Christian historians gave "witness" to this plan, while the Greek was a creator who gave "accounts" by placing events in broader frameworks.

CHARLES McARTHUR DESTLER, The Crocean Origin of Becker's Historical Relativism IX, 335-342

Though students of Becker's thought have asserted that his relativism was independently derived from the influence of pragmatism, they have not specifically identified these pragmatist sources. It appears that Becker derived his views from Benedetto Croce, although he did not acknowledge this source; there are seven substantial identities between Croce's and Becker's theories of historical relativism. In fact, Becker's earliest statement of his position is so similar to Croce's previously published Estetica that Becker can be accused of ideological plagiarism.

PAUL J. DIETL, Deduction and Historical Explanation VII, 167-188

Neither strict deduction nor high expectability is a necessary condition for historical explanation. Explanations that separate history from mere narrative are necessary, but deduction from causes is not a priori the only source. Explanations in terms of reasons, emotions, and motives of actors are essential and are satisfactory when an agent's reason for an action is made convincing and believable. The principle of action must make evident the appeal of some human good in the action with which we can empathize or which is rationally understandable; there is an
intimate connection between historical explanation and moral evaluation. The alternative account of historical explanation sacrifices the simplicity of the deductive model but gains several advantages in exchange, including greater descriptive fidelity to actual historical explanations.

WILLIAM H. DRAY, On the Nature and Role of Narrative in Historiography

There is no necessary connection between the ideas of history and of narration. The historical work should be explanatory, but a narrative is not itself a form of explanation. Walsh, despite Danto's objections, is correct in distinguishing "plain" from "significant" narratives. Both White's causal-chain model and Danto's model of causal input suggest that an historical narrative can be explanatory only if it offers causal explanation. But Gallie's followable contingency model contains several structural ideas which bring him into logical conflict with the claims of these causal models. According to Gallie, explanations are intrusive, required only by failure of narrative continuity. A narrative becomes explanatory when it can incorporate contingencies, which may be necessary conditions instead of causes. History, unlike science, strives for synthetic unity rather than for the removal of all contingency from its subject matter. The role narrative plays in achieving this unity deserves increased philosophic attention.

WILLIAM H. DRAY, RICHARD G. ELY, ROLF GRUNER, Mandelbaum on Historical Narrative:

A Discussion

Dray: Mandelbaum legislates regarding the historian's "task" in the guise of descriptive analysis. He seems to envisage two fundamental tasks for the historian: explaining, and relating parts to wholes. Contrary to Mandelbaum's implication, there is no more opposition between narration and either of these tasks than there is between the two tasks themselves.

Ely: Mandelbaum refutes White and Danto, who both hold that historical writing is essentially narrative; but not Gallie, who asserts that historical writing is necessarily, but never solely, a narrative construction. The claim that history is essentially narrative is fruitful even though false because it recognizes an important characteristic of historical thinking — the historian's conceptual isolation of a series of intentional human actions from the situations with which they were designed to cope.

Gruner: Mandelbaum is correct in his criticism of narrativism, but does not support his criticism by good reasons. Historians offer both static, non-narrative descriptions and kinetic, narrative descriptions. Historical description is therefore not the same as historical narration; the latter is only a species of the former.
Previous criteria of narrative coherence have failed to come to terms with narrative intelligibility. The principle of chronology is only a negative criterion. The one entity-one story criterion, which requires every episode to refer to one and the same entity, fails both in its positive and negative forms. The Aristotelian concept of necessary connection is useless for historians because there are no natural beginnings or endings in history. Yet genetic relationships in narrative, though they cannot be reduced to causal or probabilistic relationships, do give coherences. History becomes science when historians transform stories into histories by seeking the mechanisms which underlie the genetic relationships between historical incidents. The construction of history in narrative form does not, therefore, cut the historian off from science, as positivists contend.

**PAULA SUTTER FICHTNER**, History, Religion, and Politics in the Austrian *Vormärz*  
X, 33-48

Intellectuals in post-1815 Austria were divided into liberal Josephinians and conservative Catholic Romantics. The former supported Enlightenment-inspired reforms, especially the maintenance of government controls on the exercise of religion. The latter, convinced by the French Revolution of the destructiveness of Enlightenment ideas, sought to reestablish a version of the medieval German Empire where the Church would play a leading role. As historians, both the liberal Hammer-Purgstall and the conservative Bucholtz used their discipline as a tool to win others to their points of view. However, the historians' shared belief that truth depends on wide consultation of sources allowed Chmel to emphasize the mechanics of history rather than its interpretation and accounts for the fact that Austrian historiography was distinguished for its technicians rather than for its thinkers throughout the second half of the nineteenth century.

**RUTH FINNEGAN**, A Note on Oral Tradition and Historical Evidence  
IX, 195-201

The assumption that "oral tradition" is unitary and somehow impervious to influences which historians consider when analyzing written sources is mistaken. Oral tradition falls into three broad categories — formalized oral literature, informal historical knowledge, and personal recollections — and each has its own particular dangers or limitations. Critical assessment is even more important for oral sources than for written ones because, as shown by a number of African examples, oral sources are less permanent and more dependent on the performer, audience, and social situation.
ROBERT WILLIAM FOGEL, Historiography and Retrospective Econometrics IX, 245-264

In the past ten years, econometric history has changed from a novelty into the predominant form of research in American econometric history. Cliometricians have not introduced mathematics into economic history, but have made explicit the implicit mathematics which has always been embedded in the discipline. Rather than narrowing the range of issues treated by economic historians, econometric research has raised substantial challenges to such classic issues as the profitability of the slave economy of the ante-bellum South and the developmental impact of transportation improvements. Though some are alarmed at the prevalence of counterfactual conditional statements in this new approach, to ban such judgments would transform history into mere chronology. Furthermore, verifying the typical counterfactual poses no special epistemological problems. The only real problem with counterfactuals is determining the correct descriptive equation.

BERNARD L. FONTANA, American Indian Oral History: An Anthropologist's Note VIII, 366-370

Oral history gives the anthropologist direct access to Indian history. Anthropologists, like historians, are concerned whether oral traditions are "true." Aside from the favored technique of checking the spoken against the written word, the anthropologist must understand the social roles and various literary categories of oral tradition. The anthropologist, unlike the historian, is primarily concerned with culture history and therefore emphasizes the mundane rather than the extraordinary. Finally, anthropologists are as concerned with how other people define truth for themselves as they are with ascertaining truth from their own cultural perspective.

M. J. GEFTER AND V. I. MALKOV, Reply to a Questionnaire on Soviet Historiography VI, 180-207

Marxism provides regularities needed for a scientific basis for scholarship and completes the search for general meaning and a mechanism in historical change that is the only alternative to skepticism. Social-economic formations, autonomous organisms, show links in the historical chain and lead to a study of revolutions as focal points of change. The direction of history is determined — the potential of a more perfect stage is contained in the imperfect actuality. But the form of change depends crucially on human action and "accident." Marxist laws, like all scientific laws, are based on facts and yet guide selection of problems; there are no neutral, unbiased historians; and Marxists strive to serve progress. There are no abstract truths, only concrete truths that embody the reality of the general; the Russian Revolution is an example of a specific form of a general regularity.
LEON J. GOLDSMITH, Collingwood's Theory of Historical Knowing  IX, 3-36

Collingwood's well-known dicta about history and its practice are not expressions of a perverse idealism but are rooted in reflection on his own work as historian. The problem which informs his writings on history was to make sense of the discipline of history without opening the way to historical skepticism. The early view of his Speculum Mentis, rooted in an external philosophical stance and not in the actual practice of history, was actually skeptical. In his middle years he regarded history as the science of historical evidence, but this view left obscure the interest of history in the historical past. In his most mature view, as expressed in The Idea of History, Collingwood comes to see how the discipline of history, judged in terms of its own procedures and not by external norms imposed upon it from other sources, is able to make responsible knowledge claims and avoid the threat of skepticism. His well-known views about the historian's re-thinking past thought, the autonomy of history and the historical imagination all play roles to that end, and are entirely reasonable when it is understood what Collingwood intends by them. They are part of his theory of historical knowing, not of historical explanation.

SHIRLEY M. GRUNER, Political Historiography in Restoration France  VIII, 346-365

The publication in 1814 of De la monarchie française by Montlosier inaugurated a debate over the development of French history which made the period of the Bourbon Restoration one of the most seminal in French historiography. Montlosier viewed French history as the struggle between the Franks and the Gauls transformed into a struggle between the nobles and the third estate. He felt that this struggle would result eventually in violence and end with the absolute subordination of one group to the other. While the book was written to justify the nobles, it presented all the details for a class justification of the third estate. The liberals promptly developed "industrialism," which expressed the necessity of reorganizing society along the lines of industry. Though few other history books were published in this period, later Marxist and economic histories could not have been written without the ideas this book stimulated.

JAMES S. HELPER, Introduction to Beiheft on Method in the History of Religions  VII, Bei. 8, 1-7

The history of religions is grounded in a hermeneutic situation, an interpretative framework that establishes possibilities of creative analysis. The situation of historians of religions often fails to permit an alien world of meaning to retain its integrity because the scholars' ultimate values are threatened. Methodological solipsism—the requirement that descriptions rest on the researcher's own observations—is common. Otto, van der Leeuw, Eliade, and Zaehner are examples of men whose conclusions are too clearly functions of what they assume to be limits of understanding; ultimacy situates scholarship and determines it.
JURGEN HERBST, Theoretical Work in History in American University Curricula VII, 336-354

Theoretical courses are offered by nearly ninety percent of universities and colleges; ninety percent of schools offering courses have courses in history departments, forty percent in philosophy departments. Theoretical work is largely the province of graduate departments in large public universities. More than half the courses offer vaguely defined mixtures of historiography, philosophy and methodology, and more eclectic courses are the most favored. Support of theoretical courses by history departments is high, but one-fifth of departments have complaints about vague subject matter. Philosophy departments offer occasional lecture-discussion courses, usually the responsibility of one member; they are less controversial but regarded by departments as less central. Theses in theoretical work are rare.

J. L. HERKLESS, Meinecke and the Ranke-Burckhardt Problem IX, 290-321

At various times in his career Meinecke discussed the differences between Ranke and Burckhardt regarding their ideas about such things as mass democracy, the nation state and its power, and the importance of material development. But his assessment of the fundamental difference underlying these particular differences changed. By 1948 he concluded that it lay in two opposing views of the world and of history implicit in nineteenth-century German idealist philosophy. One view, represented by Ranke, maintains that the world and humanity have a rational sense, which manifests itself objectively in institutions like the state. The other, the subjective view, represented by Burckhardt, is an "idealism of freedom" (Dilthey), which seeks to preserve individuality from an irrational and hostile external world. By this excessive intellectualization, Meinecke really obscured the fundamental similarity between Ranke and Burckhardt.

J. H. HEXTER, The Rhetoric of History VI, 3-13

An examination of footnotes, quotations, and name-lists shows that historians try to follow the reality rule — to tell about the past the most likely story that can be sustained by the relevant existing evidence. But this is modified by the maximum impact rule — stories must have evocative force, and the reader should actively confront the past. The maximum impact rule may require the historian to sacrifice some completeness and exactness for evocative impact; and there is no parallel to this sacrifice in scientific explanations. History, as it is practiced, is a rule-bound discipline, with rules and a rhetoric different from those of scientific explanation. There is no need for historians to structure their explanations according to the pattern of the sciences.

DAVID A. HOLLINGER, Perry Miller and Philosophical History VII, 189-202

Miller's formulation of problems was controlled by tensions between "conscious" and "mechanical" and between "understanding" and "mys-
tery." The mechanical world, devoid of morality and purpose, was incompatible with conscious beauty and ethics; within the "conscious" the optimistic drive for knowledge about an intelligible universe conflicted with belief in an unknowable, awful universe. Miller's history was also informed by his sense of development: history proceeds in a continuing series of interactions between inherited cultural forms and immediate environmental circumstances. Culture is never merely the "product" of environment, but an active agent in the interaction. The search for "historical knowledge" itself proceeds on the terms of this interaction. Here Miller rejected both positivism and the capricious relativism of Becker for the harder relativism subsequently articulated by Kuhn and Toulmin: "forms" are neither wholly arbitrary nor entirely discovered in "the facts," but are instead the inheritance and creation of the historian, altered and confirmed by his experience.

WILHELM VON HUMBOLDT, On the Historian's Task VI, 57-71

Humboldt postulates that historiography is the narration of what has happened, yet claims that the historian must have an intuition into ideas and must make use of his sense of humanity. History must give a vision of man's fate in its complete truth and enliven our sense of acting on reality. Claiming that there are hidden determining forces in history, he still stresses the role of free, creative energy. While he rejects final causes in history early in the essay, he returns to the notion at the end: All of the apparent contradictions are resolved in the attempt to reveal truth, the form of history, by the simple narration of events, by applying pre-existing general ideas to new and specific cases.

S. C. HUMPHREYS, History, Economics, and Anthropology: The Work of Karl Polanyi VIII, 165-212

Polanyi's denial of the universal applicability of economic theory must be seen in the context of early socialist economics and the development of the sociology of knowledge by his contemporaries and compatriots Lukács and Mannheim. Polanyi's classification of economic types to serve as a basis for a comparative, substantive economic theory—reciprocity, householding, redistribution, market exchange—distinguished modes of allocation rather than production. Regulation governing trade, markets, and money in economies of reciprocity and redistribution received particular attention. The classification is useful not so much for identifying economies corresponding to the ideal types as for analyzing the interrelations between subsets of institutions in a single economy. Polanyi's own work on the "port of trade" is an example. His ideas are also used by ancient historians.


Gernet (1882-1962) was a classical scholar who worked closely with Durkheim, Granet, and other members of the Année sociologique school. Study of his treatment of Greek myth, religion, and social institutions
shows him to have been a pioneer in the structuralist approach to semantics and the study of myth as a form of language. In his work on law, he applied Durkheim's idea of the creative power generated by mass religious assemblies to the mass juries and political assemblies of ancient Greece. Reacting to social crisis by the establishment of organized justice, Greek society developed consciousness of its structure and powers, and the capacity for abstract reasoning about institutions and policy.

GEORGE G. IGERS, The Decline of the Classical National Tradition of German Historiography VI, 382-412

Since Ranke, German historiography has been dominated by historicism. History defies conceptualism and systematic analysis; it requires empathetic understanding (Verstehen) of the individualities which compose history, a narrative account of the intentions and actions of great individuals and states. Value judgments are to be suspended; military power and foreign policy are stressed. Defeat in World War I had little impact on German historical scholarship. Hintze's attempts at structural analysis and Kehr's efforts to study foreign policy within the framework of domestic history met opposition. Traditional methodological and political assumptions remained important after 1945 in the work of G. Ritter, H. Rothfels, and others; at the same time these assumptions were increasingly questioned by a new generation of historians committed to democratic values who sought to integrate the methods of political science, sociology, and economics with those of history.

DAVID P. JORDAN, Gibbon's "Age of Constantine" and the Fall of Rome VIII, 71-96

Gibbon had more difficulty dealing with the age of Constantine than with any other period of Roman history. In the tradition of Enlightenment historiography, Gibbon was a philosophic historian, one who strove for interpretative and significant history. For Gibbon the age of Constantine was one of those crucial eras when civilization changed its direction. He was convinced that the growth of Christianity was a principal cause of the decline and fall of the Roman Empire and saw in the career of Constantine a microcosm of this process. In order to indict Christianity and prove Rome's fall in moral terms, Gibbon never actually distorted the facts, but he arranged the evidence, especially that referring to the date of Constantine's conversion, to support his novel interpretation.

DONALD R. KELLEY, The Rise of Legal History in the Renaissance IX, 174-194

While the study of legal history grew up largely within the confines of the legal profession, it was equally the offspring of Renaissance humanism. Legal humanism, a branch of philology developed by lawyers rather than historians, laid the foundation for the study of legal, institutional,
and even some social history. These lawyers based their work on the humanist method of critical reading of original sources, but soon realized that a truly historical view of law also required a systematic understanding of jurisprudence. Their method led them to explore canon and feudal as well as Roman law. Although the legal humanists had no intention of allowing the science of law to be governed by the liberal arts, they did professionalize the study of legal history and thus reshaped historical scholarship in general. This experience demonstrates the importance of interdisciplinary work in history.

M. D. KING, Reason, Tradition and the Progressiveness of Science  X, 3-32

Most sociologists of science have accepted R. K. Merton's view that there is no intrinsic connection between the ideas scientists hold and the way they behave. Merton based his approach on an extended analogy between science and economics. He assumed a division between the scientific "product" governed by an inflexible a-social logic and the processes of scientific "production" propelled by "non-logical" social behavior. Kuhn rejects this "divorce of convenience" and argues that "local" traditions which resist rationalization characterize both the theory and practice of science. Politics, law, and religion provide more apt analogies for scientific activity than economics. However, Kuhn's attempt to replace epistemology with sociology in order to retain the notion of progressiveness in science blunts his contribution. His sociological approach would be most fruitful if he adopted "epistemological agnosticism."

ISAAC KRAMNICK, Augustan Politics and English Historiography:
The Debate on the English Past, 1730-1735  VI, 33-56

Bolingbroke, a Tory, adopted Whig history and stressed the ancient constitution and the age-old heritage of Commons and freedom in England in order to show that people were less free under Walpole than they had been in ancient times. Walpole, a Whig, made Brady and Tory history respectable to counter this partisan use of history. Walpole said that Commons developed as a result of feudal obligation; freedom began with the Glorious Revolution and was based on Locke's natural rights as supported by the Whigs. This was a reversal of the Old Whig position that used the ancient constitution to support the rights of parliament against the claims of the Tory kind. The reversal began when Whig clergy used Tory history to support their position in the Convocation Controversy after 1697. By making Brady's history respectable, Walpole performed a great service to English historiography.

BRUCE KUKLICK, The Mind of the Historian  VIII, 313-331

A model constructed from the "ideal observer" ethical theory accounts for many pervasive peculiarities of the craft of history and reflects central elements of the mind of the practicing historian. Both the ideal historian and the ideal observer can be characterized by the same adjec-
tives: omniscient, disinterested, dispassionate, consistent, objective, and empirical. In discussions of human conduct historians try to make evaluations from the point of view of an ideal observer. The historian's ideal of objectivity, his faith in a basic ontological structure which gives order and intelligibility to the world, and his "method of empathic understanding" (Verstehen) are all illuminated by the model.

A. R. LOUCH, History as Narrative

VIII, 54-70

Narrative as it is used by historians is not merely an incidental, stylistic feature of the historian's craft, but essential to historical explanation. Narrative presupposes a world of things that endure through change. Stories fill in the gaps in our experience and thus make continuity visible. Ideally, narrative stands proxy for experience, though this ideal can never be attained. No criterion can be formulated that will signify when a story is complete enough. The changing perspective of the historian and the infinite detail with which he has to deal makes his task a continuous one. Yet the historian cannot be radically subjective because his story is always limited by the chronology of his events and the accuracy of his details. The rationale of narrative enables the historian to repudiate the covering-law model of historical explanation.


X, 318-346

Plymouth can be regarded as a test case of the relationship Weber posited between the Protestant ethic and Capitalism. Although the Plymouth experience confirms Weber's idea that Calvinism made labor an absolute end in itself and that religious belief gave a direction to practical conduct, it gives little support to the notion that it also encouraged individualism. In a small isolated society dominated by a congregational church, Calvinism generated an agreed-upon code of social behavior which was strictly enforced and which inhibited the freedom of individual expression. The Protestant ethic fostered individualism and consequently the development of capitalism only where congregations maintained themselves within larger societies controlled by non-Calvinists.

MAURICE MANDELBAUM, A Note on History as Narrative

VI, 413-419

The belief of Gallie, Danto, and others that history is constructing narratives is too simplistic and neglects the role of inquiry and discovery. Teleology in history — only events relevant to a known outcome find a place in a work — while similar to that in narratives is not decisive, since in any explanation the explicandum controls the explicans to some extent. History is not recounting a linear sequence of intelligible human actions but is an analysis of a complex pattern of change into factors that served to make it what it was. Social backgrounds and conditions that are influences but not actually parts of the story of actions are crucial; the fundamental relationship is part to whole, not antecedent to consequent.
Collingwood shows that history is the science of mind that gives self-knowledge by asking how historical knowledge is possible. Critics claim he over-intellectualizes the subject matter of history and the historian's process of thinking. The dialectical theory of mind, the theory of absolute presuppositions, and the logic of question and answer—all developed in Collingwood's works other than The Idea of History—show these objections to be mistaken. In his theory of mind, the "thought" re-enacted by historians includes feelings, desires, perceptions, and imagination. History differs from current practice, and counter-examples from what are chronicles, not history, do not discredit Collingwood's theories. History provides necessary and complete answers only to specific questions as they reflect a set of absolute presuppositions (a priori conceptual systems); it is re-enactment, not representation, of the past.

ARNALDO MOMIGLIANO, J. G. Droysen Between Greeks and Jews

J. C. Droysen was the first to use the term “Hellenism” to designate the civilization of the Greek-speaking world after Alexander, and much of the confusion over what the term is intended to signify derives from Droysen's own difficulty in relating the political to the cultural aspects of that period. Droysen defined Hellenism as that stage in the evolution of paganism which led from classical Greece to Christianity. The most convincing explanation for Droysen's abandonment of cultural history is that his close personal ties with Jewish converts to Christianity made the problem of the relationship between Judaism and Christianity taboo. When Droysen started his History of Hellenism, the emphasis was on the encounter of Greek and non-Jewish Orientals; but after the work of the Tiibingen school, it was impossible to talk seriously about the origins of Christianity without a prolonged study of the Jewish background.

GERT MÜLLER, History as a Rigorous Discipline

Analytic history is the legitimate successor of philosophy of history. To speak of laws that predict historical succession ("dynamic laws") no longer seems justified. Nonetheless, generally valid statements about "invariances" ("static laws") continue to be necessary conditions of any objective analysis. Historicism has often confused formal methods and material content and thus erroneously denied important generalizations. A close examination of historical action shows the need for rules, or codes, as frameworks for any action. Such rules or codes condition but do not cause, or determine, individual actions. Since these rules are subject to rational scrutiny, they are able to provide an objective understanding of history. Among all conceptual tools, the founding function is the most powerful one. Thus, the vague statement that culture (C) is dependent on society (S) becomes amenable to a strict logical formulation, which culminates in a formula expressing the categories of historical description.
Many historians and philosophers of history hold that no counterfactual can be given any degree of credibility, and it is true that counterfactuals cannot be logically refuted or confirmed. Yet if everything which is not definitely true is defined as a "fiction," very little is left in human discourse. While certain knowledge is preferable to highly credible knowledge, philosophic speculation suggests that knowledge is at best highly credible. And even though there are no formal methods of handling counterfactuals which would ensure standard results, we do have sound empirical propositions to back up counterfactuals. Counterfactuals have already been used with reasonable degrees of credibility in the areas of policy models, the analysis of consumer surplus, and the analysis of costs and benefits. If history is to go beyond description, counterfactuals must be employed, for without them it would be impossible to appraise actions and their consequences.

Programming computers to construct "real types," generally descriptive of a class of societies, makes explicit all steps in the thought process of such constructions because unambiguous instructions to the computer are needed. The historian uses his judgment to choose a data field and variables that may be relevant in forming a type. He then looks for matches; he divides the data field into groups according to one variable and sees if the other variables differ significantly according to these groups. In this process, he may discover new variables of importance. The selection of interesting types from among the matches can be determined only by the pragmatic interest of the historian; analysis of this selection process involves some of the most difficult problems in the study of historical technique. The computer using a "real type" program may be useful as a quick means to scan data.

Eleventh-century Europe was dominated by a single political and economic elite with position based on control of the means of coercion; by the end of the fifteenth century there were various elites with power based on control of some form of production. Theories based on trade, population, and the class struggle have been advanced to account for this change but are inadequate because they posit causal relationships running from some single independent factor. A different form of explanation emphasizes the network of relationships among economic and political units. Here economic power is crucial. The development of new technology shifted the economic leverage of the nobility to the mer-
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FREDERICK JACOB, Decisive History?

NEUSNER, Jacob in the History of Religions VII, Bei. 8, 31-45

JACOB NEUSNER, Judaism in the History of Religions VII, Bei. 8, 31-45

Jewish studies comprehend history, theology, law, and practices. It is analogous to an area study; experts in different fields are necessary. Specialists in Jewish history are useful in a history department but must have expertise in a particular time or place. Judaism can be a significant subject for the phenomenology and morphology of religions. Theological concern about the validity of a part of the Judaeo-Christian heritage can be suspended, and Judaism subjected to the sort of study of structures appropriate to Oriental religions. Examination of the transmutation of religion in modern times is especially appropriate. A loss of engagement of feeling is possible today. Non-Jews can study the religion and can depend to a certain extent on translations. Appropriate methods and issues for a study of Judaism must be determined.

GEORGE DENNIS O'BRIEN, Does Hegel Have a Philosophy of History? X, 295-317

Hegel is usually regarded as a "speculative" philosopher of history, claiming to discover a pattern or meaning in the historical process as a whole. On the contrary, he held that history deals only with those events of which there are historical accounts; the distinction between "speculative" and "critical" philosophy of history thus has no meaning for Hegel. In "original" history, written by participants, subject and object are one; in "reflective" history they are divided, and the historian's attitudes and beliefs themselves become uneliminable constituents of the history of historiography. "Philosophical world history" is not about the totality of events and deeds, but is the dialectical product of reflective history including the history of historical interpretation. It is, in fact, the history of historical consciousness, the history of ideas seen in its internal principle.

FREDERICK A. OLAFSON, Narrative and the Concept of Action IX, 265-289

Danto and White, alone among philosophers who emphasize the narrative structure of historical writing, attempt to reconcile historical narrative with the regularity theory of explanation. Their efforts fail because neither realizes that the concept of intentional action lies at the root of historical understanding. Danto's insistence that historical events can under some description be subsumed under universal causal laws forces him to disallow and thus to sacrifice the integrity of explanations that are intelligible to the historical agents themselves. White does not see that "action," not "thought" or "underlying condition," may be "the decisive cause" of an event. Though the attempt to square historical narrative with the regularity theory is not doomed from the start, it has no chance of success until the concept of action, now being intensively analyzed by philosophers, is better understood.
Morton White shows that history has essential terms whose replacement in statements may change the truth value of the statements. But White's reduction of historical statements fails to make clear that there are terms specific to history (i.e., terms used first in history, not borrowed from another discipline it presupposes), although in a weak sense, since other disciplines can use the terms without borrowing from history. History is not the last of the sciences — strong in borrowed concepts but weak in independent theory — since a great deal of history is unlike natural sciences that have specific technical vocabularies. History applies natural language and common-sense concepts to past actions; it has moral and aesthetic dimensions.

Anthropology is unabashedly reductionist, seeks "explanations" for ritual, and uses psychology and sociology; the historian of religions seeks "understanding" of myths without reduction. Anthropological work is based on Taylor, Spencer, and Frazier and stresses the function of myth for social solidarity, unity of society and the psyche, or as symbolic expression of social relations. But functionalism fails to explain myths since social solidarity is an unintended consequence of myths. History of religions sees myths as encounters with Ultimate Reality. Symbols serve as a framework for rational thought and provide coherent unity to the world. But myths are described as symbols of symbols that refer to the sacred and get lost without a reference. Both methods reject or suspend the cognitive content of myth, and the referent of symbolic myth remains the problem of both disciplines.

The development starts with post-Cartesian skepticism, with Bayle's opposition of historical to logical certitude, his separation of being from thought, his reduction of systems to historical facts. Since factual analysis, incapable of comprehending what is generalizable in history, led nowhere, a more complex structure was needed. Voltaire, combining the factual with the systematic, used the supra-historical concept of bon sens as a tool of analysis. In causality, he conceived of the hypothesis of a common cause of phenomena, the esprit de temps, but had to derive it from the phenomena rather than the phenomena from it. Montesquieu's forward step was to take man himself as the supra-historical concept. While this separation of historical from human established law-likeness for historical facticity, his deterministic theories proved too restrictive, and the uniqueness and the generality of historical facts remained too sharply divided. It was Turgot's conception of development (derived from Bossuet), his idea of progress (derived from scientific, moral, and economic thought), that finally put the concept of time itself into the sphere of the general, establishing law-likeness for the sequence of historical happenings.
LEON POMPA, Vico's Science

According to Vico, philosophy and history had been too narrowly conceived. Philosophy had ignored the historical and empirical conditions which affect human nature, while history had ignored the metaphysical conditions. Vico therefore developed a science which would wed the two disciplines. Philosophy would provide a theory of human nature and an empirical theory about the determinate historico-sociological laws which govern human history. An "ideal external history" would be deduced from these and confirmed by its capacity to provide the systematic assumptions required for the conversion of historical evidence into historical fact. Since neither knowledge of laws nor knowledge of facts could be established independently, historico-sociological theory and historical investigation would be revealed as necessary aspects of a single epistemological enterprise.

JACOB M. PRICE, Recent Quantitative Work in History: A Survey of the Main Trends

Although much of their work contained undeveloped quantitative presuppositions or conclusions, professional historians before 1900 made relatively little use of quantitative data. At the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the general development of the social sciences, increasing publicity about disputes between rival schools, and the changing relative importance of nations helped to draw historians' attention to quantitative material. As a result of the great breakthroughs in computer technology, this trend has become more pronounced since 1945, especially after 1960. In the next decade most quantitative work in history will be in the fields of economic history, political history, social structure, economic sociology, and historical demography. Nevertheless, the bulk of historical work will probably continue to be substantially non-quantitative. And even those who otherwise welcome the new approach are worried that historians will begin to master methodology without reference to problems, thereby sacrificing important questions for esthetic satisfactions.

MELVIN RICHTER, Bibliography of Signed Works by Elie Halévy

Though engaging in little mutual polemic, the two men may be fruitfully compared. Sartre's dialectic is both a logic of investigation and an ongoing relationship between man and his total environment; Lévi-Strauss analyzes culture and reserves dialectic for the interaction of fundamental structural features. Sartre sees language as not yet fully dialectical, thus as constraint to self-knowledge; for Lévi-Strauss lan-
Language reveals to us the direct workings of the mind, in its structure of binary opposites. Whereas Lévi-Strauss works down past the individual, emphasizing the deep structure of marriage exchange systems, Sartre points out that men freely consent to remain in such groups and abide by these rules. For Sartre history is disorder made rational by the operation of the dialectic; for Lévi-Strauss history has no predetermined order and consists only in its method, exhibiting the mental structures polarized around the conceptions before and after. Beyond mutual misunderstandings, Lévi-Strauss may be faulted for contriving some of his dyads and ignoring the ambiguities in them; his system is prone to misplaced concreteness and to interpretations which only confirm its own existence. Sartre has not produced his promised ethical system and gives only a vague guide to contemporary problems. But one need not become either a "Sartrian" or a "Lévi-Straussian" to appropriate important concepts from each man; there is a phenomenological middle ground in which the two—and others—might be synthesized.

NATHAN ROTENSTREICH, The Idea of Historical Progress and Its Assumptions X, 197-221

The idea of historical progress, despite its many variations, is anchored in a coherent structure of thought which implies a cumulative advance toward an all-encompassing encounter with a universal norm and its realization. The phenomenological structure of history is, however, inconsistent with the theoretical assumptions on which the idea of progress is based. Because meaning is not immanent in history but introduced by human beings, no total merger between reality and meaning is possible. The fact that equality, freedom, and humanity have all been suggested as the ultimate goal of historical progress illustrates that the very idea of a universal norm oversimplifies the complex structure of history. Furthermore, those who try to parallel scientific advancement with historical progress do not recognize that historical deeds cannot be depersonalized like natural events.

NORMAN RUDICH AND MANFRED STASSEN, Wittgenstein's Implied Anthropology: Remarks on Wittgenstein's Notes on Frazer X, 84-89

Wittgenstein's criticisms of Frazer reveal a subjective theory of the social sciences. Wittgenstein refuses to accept Frazer's contention that customs are rooted in interpretations of nature, and feels that this genetic approach does not lead to either empirical or formal knowledge outside the natural sciences. His attack on Frazer's work is really an attack on the very idea of a causal account of history. In the tradition of Humean skepticism, Wittgenstein sees plausible description, not scientific explanation, as the highest aim of the social sciences. Yet Wittgenstein's method is a futile dogma in that it rules out cross-cultural comparison from the start.
PAUL SAKMANN, The Problems of Historical Method and of Philosophy of History in Voltaire X, Bei. 11, 24-59

Voltaire's reform program for history-writing emerges when his scattered utterances on method are collected under three headings: I. Details. Voltaire objects to tedious details, but characterizing detail can be used. There must be selection, and its criterion is significance to large-scale trends. II. Falsehoods. Most historians are to be distrusted. Falsehoods arise from relating very ancient or mythical elements, a matter Voltaire comprehends only superficially; also from partisanship, exaggerations, and traditions. Criteria of probability and for the evaluation of testimony are explained. III. The new history. Unlike crude, pedantic historiography of dynastic and political affairs, the new history must deal with leading ideas, cultural, ethnographic, and economic factors. Voltaire's universalism, his stress on humanity and mankind, is limited by his patriotic and monarchical bias and by polemical and stylistic concerns. — Other Voltairean observations are assembled under judgments on his predecessors (IV.); and under his evaluation of historical figures and events in ancient, medieval, and modern history (V.), marked by correct insights but also by occasional naivety and credulity.

IHOR SEVCENKO, Two Varieties of Historical Writing VIII, 332-345

There are two types of historians: the vivid historian or butterfly and the technical historian or caterpillar. The former believes that complete history is neither possible nor desirable. Selection is necessary, and proper selection distinguishes good historians from bad ones. Facts are unimportant in themselves but are used to find underlying principles. The latter puts a premium on the discovery of new facts, letting interpretation take care of itself. While the technical historian's truths are too small, the vivid historian's truth is too big. The differences between the two types, in part temperamental, are also based on the periods in which they work; non-modern historians tend to be technical and modern historians vivid because the former are faced with a scarcity of sources, the latter with an overabundance.

WILLIAM H. SEWELL, JR., Marc Bloch and the Logic of Comparative History VI, 208-218

The comparative method can be used to find explanatory relationships between phenomena, to discover the uniqueness of different societies and to formulate historical problems. The same logic is always used; if phenomenon A is said to exist because of the existence of condition B, we look for other social units where A occurs without B. If we find none, confidence in our hypothesis increases. Units of comparison vary not only with the aspect of social life being studied, but also with the experimental hypothesis used for comparison. Units need not be geographical, but may be any social systems. Spatial and temporal proximity of units is helpful, but not necessary. Comparative logic offers only a set of rules for gathering evidence for tests, and hypotheses must be supplied by historical imagination.
QUENTIN SKINNER, Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas

Emphasis on autonomy of texts presupposes that there are perennial concepts. But researchers’ expectations (or paradigms that influence them) may turn history into mythology of ideas; researchers forget that an agent cannot be described as doing something he could not understand as a description, and that thinking may be inconsistent. They will never uncover voluntary oblique strategies and by treating ideas as units will confuse sentences with statements. On the other hand, a contextual approach to the meaning of texts dismisses ideas as unimportant effects. Neither method shows how what was said was meant is crucial for understanding. There are no perennial problems; philosophers of different times do not speak directly to us. But history of ideas helps us recognize the contingency of many of our beliefs.
MORTON SMITH, Historical Method in the Study of Religion VII, Bei. 8, 8-16

History can determine neither the origin nor the nature of religion, but it can provide individual histories of individual religions among civilized peoples (with generalizations about patterns perhaps possible later). It can examine the content of the evidence, investigate the background and then interpret and judge reliability. Atheism—the belief that the gods never intervene in the world—is methodologically necessary, for history must try to find the most probable explanation, and this will always be some set of natural causes. Sympathy with the subjects is necessary, but objectivity must be maintained and historical explanation must reckon with the possibility—indeed, the likelihood—of fraud.

ROBERT C. STALNAKER, Events, Periods, and Institutions in Historians’ Language VI, 159-179

In the same way that it is possible—by a loosely specified class of more or less well accepted statements—to know the referent of an ordinary proper name, we can understand a name like “the Renaissance.” But names of events and periods have an indeterminacy not shared by names of men; with holistic names, the criteria of identity for the kind of thing are fluid, while the analogous criteria for being a man are not. Despite this indeterminacy, the conceptualization of events and periods is useful in historical inquiry, where general statements about events, periods, and institutions can be reconciled with statements about particular facts, and with the evidence. Holistic terms cannot reasonably be prohibited on philosophical grounds; their legitimate use is a problem historians must judge case by case.

DOUGLAS J. STEWART, Sallust and Fortuna VII, 298-317

Sallust used Fortuna to give his story specialized political meaning and to incorporate materials and judgments that extend the purview of his narrative to all of Roman history. Fortuna is a configuration of events that appears at certain moments in a state’s existence and presents demands for careful application of intelligence, virtus, animus or ingenium, if things are to proceed well and a new era is to begin (e.g., Marcus Cato and Gaius Caesar). If virtus is not present, fortuna rages and destroys (as with Catiline). Admirable men seek gloria through virtus, but also require an historian to reconstruct actions. Fortuna offers men of leisure the opportunity to apply intelligence to a course of events and to write and therefore to create history in a secondary but more lasting sense.

CUSHING STROUT, Ego Psychology and the Historian VII, 281-297

Ego psychology, more existential than scientific in tone, has made psychoanalytic theory more congenial to historical studies, especially when
they deal with creative and conflicted leaders. Erikson's concept of the identity crisis points to the intersection of family-centered conflicts with social and cultural history. It also orients the historian to the reanimation of problems in earlier stages of the life-cycle, the importance of work to identity formation, and the neurotic function of over-identification with a troublesome parent. Phenomenologically descriptive rather than causally explanatory, psycho-biography mediates between Freud's naturalism and Collingwood's idealism by relating conscious and unconscious purposes. It establishes congruences and resonances, helping to explain in narrative form the meaning, timing, and urgency of a leader's characteristic ideas.

PAUL R. SWEET, The Historical Writing of Heinrich von Srbik  IX, 37-58

Of all Austrian historians of this century, Heinrich von Srbik made the greatest impression upon his contemporaries. Srbik identified himself with the tradition of German idealism, and was the outstanding spokesman for the all-German point of view in the years of resurgent German nationalism. In adopting the view that the German Volk provides the unifying theme for German history, Srbik did not feel he was "politicizing" history, for the tradition of German idealism, as exemplified in Ranke, had demonstrated (he thought) that one could be both scholarly and politically engaged. Srbik's most ambitious work, Deutsche Einheit, placed him in close proximity to the National Socialists even though he tried to distinguish Austrian universalism from imperialism. While he never lost faith in the idealist version of history, Srbik's confidence in national values was shaken by the Nazi experience.

ROMILA THAPAR, Interpretations of Ancient Indian History  VII, 318-335

Nineteenth-century Orientalists stressed other-worldly, unchanging qualities in ancient India and accepted almost unquestioningly the Sanskrit tradition. James Mill condemned village societies and despotic rulers, and formulated the Hindu, Muslim, and British periodization of Indian history. Nationalist historians of the 1920s accepted and glorified the Sanskritic tradition and gave primacy to political and dynastic history. However, by raising controversy they created the need for more precise historical writing relating to social history, economic organization of land and commerce, and local history. The precise nature of social relations, political power, and economic organization are now the concerns, and old assumptions about a static and homogeneous Indian society and about Mill's periodization are being rejected.

RUDOLF UNGER, The Problem of Historical Objectivity: A Sketch of Its Development to the Time of Hegel  X, Bei. 11, 60-86

The problem of historical objectivity repays study to counter the subjectivism of the neo-romantics and the arbitrary factual structures of recondite specialization. — The ancients did not develop a theoretical distinction between objective and subjective in their conception of his-
In the Renaissance, individualism impinged on the ancients' conception, but no philosophic view of historical objectivity evolved. The history-minded eighteenth century likewise failed to provide the necessary philosophical categories of historical understanding, though with Voltaire an approach to them emerged. The solution to the problem came only with the Kantian and post-Kantian concern with the epistemological problems of transcendentalism, especially from Humboldt's notion of ideas as inner forms of historical manifestations. These tendencies found their summation in Hegel's philosophy of history. Among other Hegelian insights, the concept of the realization of a concrete, objective reason in our subjective understanding solved the problem of how philosophical, i.e., objectively true, knowledge of history is possible.

RICHARD T. VANN, History and Demography VIII, Bei. 9, 64-78

The success of historical demography in establishing through statistical means the existence of family limitation in the past demonstrates that the methods of the quantitative social sciences can explain some problems better than traditional historiographical tools. In this case no literary evidence was available, and even if evidence existed it would have been too distorted to be reliable. Such findings may help historians understand broader issues such as the origins of the Industrial Revolution. Historical demography also may provide clues about the revolutionary process in Western Europe. At the same time, the transition within demography itself from a "transversal" to a "longitudinal" style of analysis suggests that it is as important for the social scientist to become "historical" as it is for the historian to become "social-scientific."

FRITZ WAGNER, Sacred and Profane History in the Age of Newton VIII, 97-111

Under the impact of twentieth-century catastrophes, historians are realizing that the disciplines of church and secular history have a transcendental point of reference. These two disciplines, separated during the dissolution of the old res publica christiana, are finally starting to converge. Secular historians' new interest in the determining aspects of religious life, church historians' attempts to combine the believer's insight with philologico-critical distance, and a common emphasis on methodology illustrate this trend. Recent publication of Newton's theological writings, suppressed and dismissed by his popularizers' trite Deism, show that Newton himself tried to overcome the tremendous tension between faith and reason which his work created. Historians today, living in a period which suggests a resonance with Newton's baroque age, should follow Newton's example and attempt a synthesis of church and secular history.

RUDOLPH H. WEINGARTNER, Some Philosphic Comments on Cultural History VII, 38-59

Philosophic reflection should consider more and different kinds of historical writing than it generally has; the logical features of cultural and
intellectual history are important. Certain highly selected features of products of human activities—not individuals or actions—are the subject matter of typical instances of intellectual history; and these features are singled out by the historian's abstracting imagination. In the "stories" which such historians tell, not only are events placed in sequential order, but the relation of reasons to products are traced—above all in such a way as to show how some later result is composed of various earlier components. Causality is not the central unifying theme; tracing the relations that hold among the features of various human products is worthwhile even where knowledge of causes remains obscure.

ROGER W. WESCOTT, The Enumeration of Civilizations IX, 59-75

In view of the popularity of scholarly books and academic courses on civilization, it is surprising that few scholars have given an explicit enumeration of the civilizations which are described and compared. Enumeration, already accomplished in biology and linguistics, is certainly also possible in history. The first step is to standardize the multifarious terminology used in the classification of civilizations. Nomenclatural harmony would enable comparisons of substance by removing the possibility that problems of wording would lead to conceptual mistakes. The typologies of some historians could be accounted for in terms of a "scale of cultural vitality," but such a schema is too reminiscent of the "Great Chain of Being," which became at best supplementary and at worst superfluous after the advent of Darwinian biology. Instead, a non-genetic hierarchy of five successively contained categories can accommodate all types of civilization.

HAYDEN V. WHITE, Croce and Becker: A Note on the Evidence of Influence X, 222-227

Destler [History and Theory IX, 335-342] is incorrect in claiming that Becker was guilty of "ideological plagiarism" from Croce. This claim rests on a misunderstanding of Croce and on a failure to realize that most of the alleged points of resemblance between Becker and Croce are so general that they could refer to the majority of leading thinkers about history at that time.

[In an editorial note, Mr. Destler demurred to these contentions.]


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